Justifying Tyranny

There is opposition to the ownership and carrying of arms by 18-20 year olds. This opposition has decided to basis its argument on the contention that since people of that age group are less responsible that it is perfectly reasonable and acceptable to restrict their rights. If they could truly viewed gun ownership as a right rather than a danger they would see the horror that they are supporting in their logic.

Their logic is that rights and privileges of an individual may be restricted basis on the social groups that person belongs to and the ability of those groups to exercise the right in question comparatively responably.

The first injustice of argument is that assertion that people should be judged on the basis of the groups they belong to rather than their own actions or qualities. I think that all discrimination based on age is reprehensible but here it may allow the anti-gun crowd to argue for group restriction while maintaining that such restriction would be abhorrent if based on social class or ethnicity. I can only assume that they would find ethnic and class based restrictions abhorrent as I have never seen that asserted from their side and many of their advocated polices disenfranchise the poor and a disproportionate number persons belonging to minority ethnic groups.

The second injustice is that rights should be dependent on any comparative standard. That civil rights should be have to be earned, won, or justified by any standard is deplorable. But a comparative standard can be manipulated to achieve almost any result one desires. For example no social group will commit less crimes with guns than people in comas thus comparatively restrictions are justified on every other group. That one can lose one's rights through no misdeed or crime but the failure to manipulate the relative statistics is vile as is the abuse of statistics in this way.

It is hardly possible not to see the many abuses have resulted from justifying actions against a group on the basis of that group's inferiority. This rational has supported harassment, humiliation, oppression, slavery, exile, and genocide of countless people. It will never again be acceptable.

If the opponents of gun ownership wish to openly support all the applications of this principle as potential just (subject to a statistical prof of inferiority of the group) then they may use this logic without hypocrisy. Otherwise they endanger us all with their by foolishly trying to legitimize an exceedingly dangerous rational for very small gain.

Contracts and Freedom

I feel that the distinction I was making in Nebbia is to fine to me clear without some explanation. First I believe that taxes are a legitimate tool of the government and that the government may use them to address a wide verity of goals and ills. Second that direct government interference in contracts (or commercial actions) requires justification to a degree that taxes don't.

By limiting the freedom of contract the government is infringing on the rights of citizens it must then prove that by doing so it protects the rights of other citizens. I also think it must prove that their isn't a clearly less intrusive means to do so.

Limitations which allow substantial room for discretion are less intrusive than direct mandates. In fact mandates may rise to the point where it is questionable if contract is actually being freely entered into. That a contract be freely entered into is essential.

It is my contention that price setting prevents parties from freely entering into contract in a was lesser limitation do not. It is on this basis I think the court should have found the New York price controls unacceptable.

I think it would be good to have the regulation of monopolies and standard rates bases on statutory rights. Perhaps they could be worded something like this: "Items or Services offered for general sale shall not be altered in price based on the purchaser or any of the qualities of the purchaser." and "The citizens of the United States, any State, or any area within a State shall have the right and power through their respective governments to regulate the business of a monopoly or of any business functioning as a monopoly within their respective area."

Supreme Blunders

NEBBIA v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK

This is a case about a New York price fixing law for the milk products. This law was challenged on the basis of the 14^th Amendment which the court had previously held to protect freedom of contract. Also it should be noted that the making a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” is a power prohibited fo the States.

“The question for decision is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk. We first inquire as to the occasion for the legislation and its history. ”

Here we see a historical narrative an ploy that usually signals a departure for the law as written or for the establishment of some sort of exception. A good case is made for the importance of milk and the milk industry.

“Various remedies were suggested, amongst them united action by producers, the fixing of minimum prices for milk and cream by state authority, and the imposition of certain graded taxes on milk dealers proportioned so as to equalize the cost of milk and cream to all dealers and so remove the cause of price-cutting. ”

United Action fair response as it is a utilization of the right of producers act in their best interest and to associate as they choose. It should only be limited as far as it conflicts with the rights of the consumers to be free from commercial exploitation or the right of competitors to do business.

Price fixing can be legitimate if accomplished through the use Tax but is illegitimate if it merely mandates the price of commodities. Some price control measures may be legitimate if they protect against the exploitation of some group but they should be structured as a forfeiture tax apportioned to those exploited.

Taxes are in general within the powers justly held by the states to utilize as they will. Unless they are utilized in such as way as to deprive the people of their rights.

“We think the contention that the discrimination deprives the appellant of equal protection is not well founded. For aught that appears, the appellant purchased his supply of milk from a farmer as do distributors, or could have procured it from a farmer if he so desired. There is therefore no showing that the order placed him at a disadvantage, or in fact affected him adversely, and this alone is fatal to the claim of denial of equal protection.”

Here the court dismiss that two people must sell the same commodity for different prices as a violation of equal protection because they could by it for the same price from the same source.

“But if it were shown that the appellant is compelled to buy from a distributor, the difference in the retail price he is required to charge his customers, from that prescribed for sales by distributors is not on its face arbitrary or unreasonable, for there are obvious distinctions between the two sorts of merchants which may well justify a difference of treatment, if the Legislature possesses the power to control the prices to be charged for fluid milk. Compare American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 , 21 S.Ct. 43; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563 , 30 S.Ct. 578; State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 , 51 S.Ct. 540, 73 A. L.R. 1464 ”

American Sugar Refining Co. v Louisiana states “The act in question does undoubtedly discriminate in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if founded upon a reasonable distinction in principle, is valid. Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes.”. This presents reasonableness as a valid infringement to the rights of people. If an action done to anyone group would be a violation if done to any other group is indeed a violation if done to the original group. Though in the case in question I think there would be an equal protection violation if the framers exempt from the tax sold their refined sugar or other wise acted as a refinery. Simply the act of refining sugar should not place one in the same class as those who sell it. But the court felt in this case that the historical preferences given to farmers justified unequal protection between sellers.

Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky here there is a clear business tax on a specific type of business (blending spirits) that applies to all who conduct it. The court rightly finds that this isn't a equal protection violation.

State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson is a tax on stores which increase per store with the number of stores owned. Think that the Tax could be an equal protection violation as constructed since the tax per store varies between owners but it is not clearly so since anyone owning the same number of stores would pay the same tax. I think the court decision to sustain the Tax is fair.

Each of these cases deals with Taxes not price fixing I would assert that a different set of standards should be in play. Though since they are currently dealing with the equal protection claim they are fair precedents.

“Second. The more serious question is whether, in the light of the conditions disclosed, the enforcement of section 312(e) denied the appellant the due process secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Here the court rightly recognizes that it is not equal protection but the potential violation of other rights that is really at question here. But with the negation of the “privileges and immunities” provision of the 14^th Amendment “due process” is the only mean by which that amendment grants protection.

“Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.”

This is a fair statement. Though detriment and harm must be treated very carefully so as not to grant the government control over every facet of both property use and contracts. Only when the rights of another are harmed should the government be able to act to safe guard those rights. For example the right of someone to engage in the selling of food may be limited by the rights of those he sells food to life and freedom from exploitation.

“Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.”

The rights of the people are and must be more fundamental than the powers of the government or the common interest.

“Thus has this court from the early days affirmed that the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in government. Touching the matters committed to it by the Constitution the United States possesses the power, as do the states in their sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the federal government, as shown by the quotations above given. These correlative rights, that of the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over property and freely to contract about his affairs, and that of the state to regulate the use of property and the conduct of business, are always in collision.”

This is true. But they federal government has placed itself as the guarantor of the rights of the people against the action of the States thus giving precedence to them.

“No exercise of the private right can be [291 U.S. 502, 525]   imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property. But subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the public need. ”

Here we see the inversion fundamental to the expansion of governmental power and intrusion into the freedoms of the people. Unless expressly granted the authority the government must yield to the rights of the people. That some infringement is inevitable is correct but that does not justify any infringement that could occur it only justifies that which is the minimum to needed to effect an expressed power of government or to protect the rights of the people (either other rights or other people).

“The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts.”

That the government may promote public welfare does not permit it to utilize any means it wishes. Again reasonableness is the cutting edge which expands the government's power and severs the rights of the people. The subjective nature of reasonableness is never addressed nor is the fact that once a rational is accepted as just in one circumstance it is accepted as such in others. It is even eventually defended as a long held power of the government even in those instances where it is unreasonable by even those who view it as such.

“The court has repeatedly sustained curtailment of enjoyment of private property, in the public interest. The owner's rights may be subordinated to the needs of other private owners whose pursuits are vital to the paramount interests of the community. The state may control the use of property in various ways; may prohibit advertising bill boards except of a prescribed size and location, or their use for certain kinds of advertising; may in certain circumstances authorize encroachments by party walls in cities; may fix the height of buildings, the character of materials, and methods of construction, the adjoining area which must be left open, and may exclude from residential sections offensive trades, industries and structures likely injuriously to affect the public health or safety; or may establish zones within which certain types of buildings or businesses are permitted and others excluded. And although the Fourteenth Amendment extends protection to aliens as well as citizens, a state may for adequate reasons of policy exclude aliens altogether from the use and occupancy of land.”

Of the examples listed only those limiting business injurious to public health and the requirements of certain materials and construction methods seem legitimate to me. The prohibition against certain kinds of advertising seems to me to be a clear violation of the rights of citizens. Other measures may or may not be acceptable depending on the circumstances.

“Laws passed for the suppression of immorality, in the interest of health, to secure fair trade practices, and to safeguard the interests of depositors in banks, have been found consistent with due process. 24 These measures not [291 U.S. 502, 527]   only affected the use of private property, but also interfered with the right of private contract. Other instances are numerous where valid regulation has restricted the right of contract, while less directly affecting property rights.”

Most of these measure are good with the exception of suppression of immorality which is subjective and tends to be used in an oppressive manner and protect no right of the people.

“The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases. Certain kinds of business may be prohibited; and the right to conduct a business, or to pursue a calling, may be conditioned. Regulation of a business to prevent waste of the state's resources may be justified. And statutes prescribing the terms upon which those conducting certain businesses may contract, or imposing terms if they do enter into agreements, are within the state's competency. Legislation concerning sales of goods, and incidentally affecting prices, has repeatedly been held valid.”

These are all good points and may be just areas for legislation. Though incidentally affecting prices is very different from fixing them.

“The public policy with respect to free competition has engendered state and federal statutes prohibiting monopolies, which have been upheld. On the other hand, where the policy of the state dictated that a monopoly should be granted, statutes having that effect have been held inoffensive to the constitutional guarantees. ”

I agree that it is just for the government to act against monopolies or to act to regulate them but I do not think it is just for the government to prohibit competition through the law.

“But we are told that because the law essays to control prices it denies due process. Notwithstanding the admitted power to correct existing economic ills by appropriate regulation of business, even though an indirect result may be a restriction of the freedom of contract or a modification of charges for services or the price of commodities, the appellant urges that direct fixation of prices is a type of regulation absolutely forbidden ”

This is I think where the appellant is correct that price fixing between two private parties intrudes to far into the rights of the people.

“The argument runs that the public control of rates or prices is per se unreasonable and unconstitutional, save as applied to businesses affected with a public interest; that a business so affected is one in which property is devoted to an enterprise of a sort which the public itself might appropriately undertake, or one whose owner relies on a public grant or franchise for the right to conduct the business, or in which he is bound to serve all who apply; in short, such as is commonly called a public utility; or a business in its nature a monopoly. The milk industry, it is said, possesses none of these characteristics, and, therefore, not being affected with a public interest, its charges may not be controlled by the state. Upon the soundness of this contention the appellant's case against the statute depends.”

Here we see case for the right of the people to be free from exploitation allowing the fixing of price in those instances where there is no less intrusive option. The assertion being that outside of those circumstance other means of preferable and required.

“The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or sells, and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 . ”

In Munn v Illinois the only objectionable thing in the law is the fix price. The requirement that a business adhere to common rate and that the business publish those rates seem does not prevent them for running their business freely or profitably. “We know that this is a power which may be abused; but that is no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.” The court in Munn reached far into British law to establish a justification for price fixing and then abdicated any responsibility for acting against the resulting abuses. Which I view as the courts responsibility as per the 1rst Anemdment's “petition the Government for a redress of grievances”

“The touchstone of public interest in any business, its practices and charges, clearly is not the enjoyment of any franchise from the state, Munn v. Illinois, supra. Nor is it the enjoyment of a monopoly; for in Brass v. [291 U.S. 502, 535]   North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 , 14 S.Ct. 857, a similar control of prices of grain elevators was upheld in spite of overwhelming and uncontradicted proof that about six hundred grain elevators existed along the line of the Great Northern Railroad, in North Dakota; that at the very station where the defendant's elevator was located two others operated; and that the business was keenly competitive throughout the state. ”

Brass v North Dakota is an escalation based on Munn even though the circumstances are quite different and the necessity and reasonableness is greatly reduced. Clearly showing the tendency for an grant of power to the government in one instance to be allowed in all.

“In German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 , 34 S.Ct. 612, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189, a statute fixing the amount of premiums for fire insurance was held not to deny due process. Though the business of the insurers depended on no franchise or grant from the state, and there was no threat of monopoly, two factors rendered the regulation reasonable. These were the almost universal need of insurance protection and the fact that while the insurers competed for the business, they all fixed their premiums for similar risks according to an agreed schedule of rates. The court was at pains to point out that it was impossible to lay down any sweeping and general classification of businesses as to which price-regulation could be adjudged arbitrary or the reverse.”

Insurance Companies function as a group monopoly and engage in business practices illegal in most other types of business. Also in the case mentioned there is no set price put forth in the law merely a prohibition on excessive rate and “special” that differ for those of similar circumstances. This is materially different that price fixing.

“Many other decisions show that the private character of a business does not necessarily remove it from the realm of regulation of charges or prices. The usury laws fix the price which may be exacted for the use of money, although no business more essentially private in character can be imagined than that of loaning one's personal funds. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 , 31 S.Ct. 132.”

The long standing relationship created by lending money increases the validity of state oversight and does the opportunity for abuse. Though mandating a fixed rate for all loans rather than a maximum rate would be unacceptable.

“Private contract carriers, who do not operate under a franchise, and have no monopoly of the carriage of goods or passengers, may, since they use the highways to compete with railroads, be compelled to charge rates not lower than those of public carriers for corresponding services, if the state, in pursuance of a public policy to protect the latter, so determines. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 274 , 53 S.Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721.”

In Stephenson v. Binford the price controls seem to be a clear overreach of government power and violation of equal protection. As it lets one type of business control another.

“It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory.”

“And it is equally clear that if the legislative policy be to curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal. The course of decision in this court exhibits a firm adherence to these principles. ”

These two stances negate one another if you claim you must judge each infringement on its own merits and also claim to have no base to make such judgments what you end up with is allowing any infringement. This is the same as saying that the State may enact what ever laws it wishes because it may be justified in enacting some of them.

“The Constitution does [291 U.S. 502, 539]   not secure to any one liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group of the people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.”

Again it depends on the nature of that harm. If that harm is merely the lack of positive effect the government wishes to see that is not sufficient but if the harm is direct and real such as injury to another or their property then it is sufficient. Also the court has stated that by enacting legislation the Legislature has implied that anything it does is not arbitrary discriminatory or irrelevant and that the court has no basis to make judgments against the judgment of the legislature. This the courts last statement is without any real limitation.

Looking at the numbers

Sean D Sorrentino at NC Gun Blog has a good post looking at the FBI's crime statistics and Joan Peterson's difficulty interpreting them.

I decided to look at the number and Japetes' presentation of them starting with the number she presented in this comment.

Looking at the National Violent Death Reporting System (which seems to have data on 18 states) I wasn’t able to find 2000 number for location of death but I did find 2008 numbers. In 2008 72.96% of women were murdered in their “House, apartment, including driveway, porch, yard” vs 46.35 % of men. Interestingly both men and women have a lesser percentage of murders occurring in the home with firearms 42.74% and 70.35% and an increased percentage of non-firearm murders 55.71% and 76.78%. Not sure what any of that means but it is interesting. I did find 2000 data for WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports in 2000 there were 16,765 homicides and 10,801 firearm homicides so firearms where used in 64.4% homicides. I am not sure which Violence Policy Center number she used but the FBI number cover this issue.

As for her comment on FBI statistics 9,146 murders with firearms out of 13,636 total 2009 murders is 67.0723% not 71.8%. She needs 644.648 additional firearm murders within the 13,636 total or she needs to add 2,285.99 firearm murder to the total to get her numbers. Her percentage of firearm murder committed with handgun is correct. 

For murder by family members (141+ 609+ 131+ 116+ 247+ 201+ 94+ 35+ 281)/13636 I get 13.6% not 24.2% as does the FBI. For murder by person known to the victim (141+ 609+ 131+ 116+ 247+ 201+ 94+ 35+ 281+ 2941+ 404+ 138+ 472+ 132+ 12+ 20)/13636 I get 43.81% not 53.8% and by known persons other than family is (2941+ 404+ 138+ 472+ 132+ 12+ 20)/13636 = 30.20% the same as the FBI. She seems to be ignoring the murder where the murders relationship to the victim is not know while presenting those number as representative of all murders. Her next statistic 34.6% should be presented as percentage of all women murdered (not those where the offender is known) in 2009 know to have been killed by their husbands or boyfriends. Her murders related to argument statistic looks correct though including romantic triangles is odd to me without that (3334+203)/(13636-4832) = 40.17492%. Murders related to other Felonies 2020/13636 = 14.81% of total murders but 22.9% of murders with known circumstances. She is correct about the percentage of murders reported with unknown circumstances

It is interesting that there is Circumstance data for murders of unknown relationship to the victim. The rate for people murdered by people they know excluding Acquaintances related to other felonies is (2020-503-489-804)/3033 = 7.39% for Acquaintances it is 503/2941 = 17.10% and Strangers 489/1676 = 29.18%. For murders of unknown relationship but known circumstances 804/(5986-3488) = 32.19% were related to another felony. This leads me the think (but does not prove) that many of the murders with unknown relationships to their victim are likely to be strangers. This is consistent logic that it is harder to identify murder who lack a relationship with their victims.

It is also clear from the data that there is a large problem with Black males committing murder and being murdered. WISQARS places the 2000-2007 puts the murder rate at 38.86 per 100000 for black males vs 9.86 for all males, 5.61 for white males, 3.81 for all whites, 2.68 for white females, 6.69 for black females, and 6.21 for the whole population. If you exclude black males that rate for the whole population drops to ((72248+ 1877+ 3255+ 5132+ 10725)/(1895436257+ 25347849+ 106480875+ 131828724+ 160307042))x 10000 = 4.02. The FBI statistics have 5890/(5890+ 5286+ 245) = 51.57% for homicides where the offender’s race is known were committed by black offenders and 6556/(6568+ 6556+ 360) = 48.62% of murder victims where the victims race was know were black. US Census Bureau puts the 2009 population at 307,006,556 and the total black alone or in combination is 40,903,772 and so comprise 13.32% (12.41% if you count only single race respondents) of thew population. For such a relatively small fraction of the population to account for close to half of those who murder and those who are murdered is very serious problem.

I think that the solution to that problem isn't arms control. There are many places in the world such as Nigeria where the lack of firearms has not provided safety for the people. I think that we need to change our laws and society so criminal isn't the highest paying job in poor communities in this country.

Voting by Party

In my local congressional race there was a Libertarian candidate. I have a lot of sympathy for Libertarians and their platform. I tend to vote for them if I don't have a good reason to like or support the Republican. Although some of that is my desire to see a greater number of parties involved in elections and government.

It can be hard at times to get good feel on the views of specific Libertarian candidates. The Libertarian in my local congressional race  was quoted in the League of Women Voters guide as wanting to repeal the 14^th Amendment. This is not a stance or course of action that I am willing to support.

It is not surprising to me that there are people, or even a large number of people, in a marginal movement that I disagree with. It is the nature of marginal movements to tolerate a greater variety of positions and ideologies. Since most of people involved with the movement will not have the chance to implement them these disparities have much less real significance than if the party was in a position to get its candidates elected.

Republican candidates also tend to take positions I disagree with. McCain for example deeply offend my sensibilities and values with McCain–Feingold as a result I refused to vote for him in the last presidential election. While my one vote wouldn't have changed the election, especially since I live in Texas, I now find that, rather than standing on principle, I wish I had chosen the lesser evil for the sake of Supreme Court nominees if nothing else. It is maddening to have to support those you distrust and disagree with because they are members of a party less likely to harm this country.

I would dearly love to see election reform. I would primarily like to see two reforms: first return the election of Senators to the states legislatures with a provision for their recall at the discretion of the legislature, second I would like to see Representatives elected in a single pool transferable voting system with no minimum threshold either by state or nationally. I think that would better represent the views and positions of the people and the states as well as stop the seesaw swings of political control.

As It Stands

I believe that the following principle should strictly adhered to:

The rights of people must be given absolute precedence and favor over ever law or issue that may come into conflict with them except for when the rights of multiple people shall be in conflict.

I believe this is the only rational which can safeguard our rights. Allowing exceptions in any particular circumstance with allow the rational use to establish the exception to be use to justify other exception in other circumstances or eventual to general limitation on our rights in light of the long standing exceptions.

I refuse to accept as legitimate any argument for the limitation of any right other that the right itself establishes the limit or that a grant of power, at least as high in the law, specifically provides for the limit and infringement. Even in those cases I view only those limitation explicitly outlined as being legitimate not those that follow logically or other wise from some derivative process.

This stance places me at odd with many of the practices and conventions of our society and system of government. For example without a specific grant of ability to directly compel individual military service I view that draft as illegitimate. However I would view the activation of regional militias as a legitimate way to compel military service. But even if accomplished in the proscribed manner I have strong reservations about forcing those truly unwilling to preform any service or labor without there begin a specific allowance made in the constitution for forced military service being permissible or not a violation of the 13^th amendment.

That such a power or limitation could be easily provided for in the constitution is self evident. That it is necessary to exceed the bounds of the constitution so as not to allow the constitution to prevent the the implementation of those effects which are desired by most citizens or those which are means towards a reasonable goal is not compelling since there is a provided means for changing the bounds of the constitution allowing those measures a legitimate means of being enacted. That such a method is harder that rationalizing away the bounds of the constitution is not only not compelling but supports the enforcement of the proscribed method since it shows that the protections and limits provided by the constitution were designed to require more effort and greater agreement to change than the normal actions of government.

We have seen a several court cases so far how minor infringements in the rights of citizens can grow into major principles allowing massive infringements. We also see how logic and rationalizing are used as tools to dismantle and obfuscate our rights. We must insist that the legislature create law which function in a logical manner make whatever changes to the law or constitution as may be needed and that the courts enforce only the actual laws as enacted rather than providing allowances for reasonableness or any other facilitation of the violation of the law as it stands.