Two Truths

There has been some back and forth, over in "Common Sense" land on the issue of if most murders are commited by people with criminal records or by people known to the victims.

It seems likely that both of these things are true as per information from the FBI. When taken together what this means is that knowing criminal is dangerous. If criminals commit most murders and they are most likely to murder people they know this conclusion is sound. There could be statistical arrangement which negate this conclusion but the relatively small criminal population and the large non-criminal population make it unlikely that the risk of being murdered by a non-criminal acquaintance is anywhere close to the risk of being murdered by a criminal one.

The question is "Is this information actionable?". On that note I am not sure. It is possible that justifies additional measures, such as monitoring or restricted living arrangements, against convicted criminals after their release from prison. It might even justify the adoption of a measures like exile for some serious offenses, which I personally find more acceptable than civil right restrictions. What would clearly be beneficial is reducing the number of criminals this I think could easily be done by ending prohibition.

Supreme Blunders

Gonzales v. Raich

“California is one of at least nine States that authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.^[1] The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States" includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.”

The court is here presented with activities solely preformed in one state and explicitly legal as per the laws of that State. The court will find that this is commerce among several states though no portion of the events where happened out side California and that the activities were not commerce.

“On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and agents from the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came to Monson's home. After a thorough investigation, the county officials concluded that her use of marijuana was entirely lawful as a matter of California law. Nevertheless, after a 3-hour standoff, the federal agents seized and destroyed all six of her cannabis plants. ”

Here Ms. Monson has suffered harm though and will be unable to effect her right to petition for redress. The court would have no problem concluding that the 3^rd Amendment is present to them was unable on it face to prevent the housing of soldier in private residences if that housing was ordered by law because the “but in a manner to be prescribed by law” would be found to be the primary component of the Amendment and even if it wasn't the interest of the government in housing troop justifies the compulsion of consent of the owners of the residences.

The court then discusses the legal course of appeals. And shows that those finding in favor of a possible find site United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison while those opposed to rest on the faulty ground of Wickard v. Filburn.

“The obvious importance of the case prompted our grant of certiorari. 542 U. S. 936 (2004). The case is made difficult by respondents' strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic purposes. The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress' power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally. Well-settled law controls our answer. The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. ”

Bad law made good with time. It is the courts view that an abuse if long standing ceases to be injurious but becomes just and right.

“This was not, however, Congress' first attempt to regulate the national market in drugs. Rather, as early as 1906 Congress enacted federal legislation imposing labeling regulations on medications and prohibiting the manufacture or shipment of any adulterated or misbranded drug traveling in interstate commerce.^[11] Aside from these labeling restrictions, most domestic drug regulations prior to 1970 generally came in the guise of revenue laws, with the Department of the Treasury serving as the Federal Government's primary enforcer. ”

The court will fail to see the distinction between the power to tax and to control interstate commerce and the board control excreted by the CSA.

“Marijuana itself was not significantly regulated by the Federal Government until 1937 when accounts of marijuana's addictive qualities and physiological effects, paired with dissatisfaction with enforcement efforts at state and local levels, prompted Congress to pass the Marihuana Tax Act, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970).^[14] Like the Harrison Act, the Marihuana Tax Act did not outlaw the possession or sale of marijuana outright. Rather, it imposed registration and reporting requirements for all individuals importing, producing, selling, or dealing in marijuana, and required the payment of annual taxes in addition to transfer taxes whenever the drug changed hands.^[15] Moreover, doctors wishing to prescribe marijuana for medical purposes were required to comply with rather burdensome administrative requirements.^[16] Noncompliance exposed traffickers to severe federal penalties, whereas compliance would often subject them to prosecution under state law.^[17] Thus, while the Marihuana Tax Act did not declare the drug illegal per se, the onerous administrative requirements, the prohibitively expensive taxes, and the risks attendant on compliance practically curtailed the marijuana trade. ”

Here the false parallel is drawn between the effects a burdensome Tax act and the CSA but it ignores the role of State in the creation of the end result. It does not acknowledge that while possible oppressive compliance with federal Tax law did not have the effect of a prohibition in the absences of State action. To claim that because to actor may through their joint exercise of power effect a result that one of the may then effect the same result against the will of the other is to abolish and usurp all the rights the States.

“Then in 1970, after declaration of the national "war on drugs," federal drug policy underwent a significant transformation. A number of noteworthy events precipitated 12*12 this policy shift. First, in Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969), this Court held certain provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act and other narcotics legislation unconstitutional. Second, at the end of his term, President Johnson fundamentally reorganized the federal drug control agencies. The Bureau of Narcotics, then housed in the Department of Treasury, merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, then housed in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), to create the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, currently housed in the Department of Justice.[18] Finally, prompted by a perceived need to consolidate the growing number of piecemeal drug laws and to enhance federal drug enforcement powers, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.[19]”

Here the court uses the correction of a previous injustice to justify the imposition of a new one. In Leary v. United States the court found that it was a violation of the 5^th Amendment to require that a citizen provide information to pay a Tax if he might suffer prosecution as a result as may be the case with drugs since they may be illegal as per State or local law. The court further found that by creating a nominal Tax with such restrictions that it could not be paid was in effect a band and as such was “ultra vires”, an act that exceeded the scope of federal authority.

Leary v. United States is less strong on the criminalization of possession as a finding of the violation of the Tax. I think that such a holding in the law is conflict with the presumption of innocence that is a fundamental part of US jurisprudence as found in Coffin v. United States. While possession is clear evidence against an accused for the crime of possession it can not be justly found the equate to all the necessary evidence for the commission of a crime such a avoiding a Tax relating to the object found in the accused's possession. In my view statutory equivalency is not a valid exercise of the law if the objective sought but the law is beyond the bounds of the government's powers equating it to something within its power is insufficient to allow it that authority. The court however found that “The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is, we think, that a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.”. I think “more likely than not” is a bad standard and that but I would be willing to accept “assured” or “inevitably” as a standard of justification allowing this sort of equivalency. The court does find that on the basis of knowledge of ordinary users on origin of their marihuana that they could not be held to know or to “naturally” conclude their particular marihuana had been imported and thus it was improper to hold their possession equivalent to the avoidance of the Tax required. This is an odd standard as it limits the power of government based upon the informed status of citizens for example if there had been an inescapable media campaign on the origin of marihuana consumed in the US then the court's ruling could have been held to be different. In fact the courts own findings in this case could be held to inform users as to the likely origin of their marihuana thus validating the law the court invalidated here. I think that only those who actually commit crimes can justly be held to liable for those crimes and on that basis equating possession with failure to pay an import tax is unjust in the absence of evidence of importation by the accused.

But in any case, a finding of Congressional over each is a odd thing to serve as the basis for additional Congressional reach.

“Title II of that Act, the CSA, repealed most of the earlier antidrug laws in favor of a comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit drugs. The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.^[20] Congress was particularly concerned with the 13*13 need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels.^[21]

To effectuate these goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA. 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a).”

Here Congress exceeds its authority. While it may wish the power to control actions not in and of themselves commerce among several States it does not justly have that power. Thus manufacturing, internal State distribution and dispensing, as well as possession are beyond its domain.

“Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress' commerce power. Brief for Respondents 22, 38. Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority ”

This is sad since it is here that the legitimate grounds for action lies. As we shall see any grant of authority is a universal grant.

“Rather, respondents' challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA's categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.”

This is their concern and as thus it can be understood why they failed to see that it is nessecary to confront the general abuse of authority to correct the derivative abuse.

“Cases decided during that "new era," which now spans more than a century, have identified three general categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce power. First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150 (1971). Second, Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate 17*17 commerce. Ibid. Third, Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Ibid.; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). Only the third category is implicated in the case at hand. ”

Interestingly only third category is beyond federal authority.

“Our case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic "class of activities" that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Perez, 402 U. S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 128-129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id., at 125. ”

And a Dictatorship is a Democracy because all decisions have the support of the only enfranchised citizen. This is an unlimited grant of power inconsistent with any real limits. I have covered Wickard v Filburn in depth and have found is devoid of just foundation. Perez v United States is about a loan shark and whether his criminal threats and extortion fall under Federal jurisdiction. While interstate lending may justly be regulated by Congress the action in question were not interstate. In the words of Justice Stewart's dissident “In order to sustain this law we would, in my view, have to be able at the least to say that Congress could rationally have concluded that loan sharking is an activity with interstate attributes that distinguish it in some substantial respect from other local crime. But it is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate setting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets. ”

“When Congress decides that the "`total incidence'" of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U. S., at 154-155 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259 (1927) ("`[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may do so'")). ”

Need does not grant ability which is the entire thrust of the Westfall decision. A society of laws must abide by the laws that govern it. To allow any part of it to ignore the law on the basis that doing is necessary because of the difficulty of compliance with the law is to negate the law in its entirety and to place in its stead power as the only surety.

“In this vein, we have reiterated that when "`a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.'" E. g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968)). ”

In the words of Justice Douglas's dissent in Maryland v Wirtz “The Court's opinion skillfully brings employees of state-owned enterprises within the reach of the Commerce Clause; and as an exercise in semantics it is unexceptionable if congressional federalism is the standard. But what is done here is nonetheless such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism. ”.

“Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself "commercial," in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”

The courts failure to see any distinction between “regulate” and “control” is deeply disturbing. By expanding the conception of regulation to include the outcomes of commerce it necessitates control over both supply and demand which should rightly stand beyond the sphere of regulation while directing the outcome of commerce. Regulation may justly mediate between supply and demand but many not justly direct, prohibit, or create them.

“While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial transactions in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”

I do not believe that regulation of commerce grants the power to prohibit.

“In assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276-280 (1981); Perez, 402 U. S., at 155-156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252-253 (1964). Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels,^[33] we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme. ”

That is it difficult is not a just rational to violate the law this defense would not be accepted for any other defendant and should not be accepted here. In a particular instance the determination be between intrastate and interstate commodity are a question for the jury. That the government should wish to resolve this uncertainty in the abstract is not in keeping with the normal practice of law. Appellants may not challenge laws through the hypothetical consequences that the law may have in other circumstances and the government should not be able to defend its laws on that basis. To do other wise is to hypocritically disparage the rights of citizens.

The author then goes on to limit the precedence of Lopez. Which it should be noted he dissented from joining a dissent which said “The third legal problem created by the Court's holding is that it threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled. Congress has enacted many statutes (more than 100 sections of the United States Code), including criminal statutes (at least 25 sections), that use the words "affecting commerce" to define their scope, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. ง 844(i) (destruction of buildings used in activity affecting interstate commerce), and other statutes that contain no jurisdictional language at all, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. ง 922(o )(1) (possession of machineguns). Do these, or similar, statutes regulate noncommercial activities? If so, would that alter the meaning of "affecting commerce" in a jurisdictional element? ” This I think is all the explame needed to show the author's hostility to the precedence at hand. That he does not over turn it is likely a concession to the necessity of holding the majority rather than any real change of opinion.

“Marijuana was listed as the 10th item in the 3d subcategory. That classification, unlike the discrete prohibition established by the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, was merely one of many "essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."”

Again we see that the view that the government may control the outcome of commerce necessitates powers beyond those actually granted to it. The strong logic that if such a total degree of control was intended the powers to effect it could have easily been granted but since they were explicitly denied such power were not intended.

They author then seeks to limit the similar Morrison precedence which he also joined a dissent from. “The premise that the enumeration of powers implies that other powers are withheld is sound; the conclusion that some particular categories of subject matter are therefore presumptively beyond the reach of the commerce power is, however, a non sequitur. From the fact that Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants an authority limited to regulating commerce, it follows only that Congress may claim no authority under that section to address any subject that does not affect commerce. It does not at all follow that an activity affecting commerce nonetheless falls outside the commerce power, depending on the specific character of the activity, or the authority of a State to regulate it along with Congress.” This refutes the dissents author's claim in Lopez that “To hold this statute constitutional is not to "obliterate" the "distinction between what is national and what is local," ante, at 567 (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); nor is it to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government to "regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens," to regulate "marriage, divorce, and child custody," or to regulate any and all aspects of education. Ante, at 564.”. These dissents provide absolutely no rational by which the power of the commerce clause could be limited for them to claim that such is not the case is the barest of fig leaves representing only the unwillingness to admit the true effect of the logic they endorse.

“Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product. ”

Economic is not a strict synonymy with commercial. Commercial requires multiple parities and the purchase or exchange of good. For example saving change is an economic activity but is not commercial. To put forth that the commerce clause allows the regulation of the economy among several States is deceptive and possibly delusional.

“The Court of Appeals was able to conclude otherwise only by isolating a "separate and distinct" class of activities that it held to be beyond the reach of federal power, defined as "the intrastate, non-commercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law." 352 F. 3d, at 1229. The court characterized this class as "different in kind from drug trafficking." Id., at 1228. The differences between the members of a class so defined and the principal traffickers in Schedule I substances might be sufficient to justify a policy decision exempting the narrower class from the coverage of the CSA. The question, however, is whether Congress' contrary policy judgment, i. e., its decision to include this narrower "class of activities" within the larger regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient.”

Here the court ignores the question of if such a class is within the authority of the Federal government when separated from the class of action which might be considered interstate commerce.

“First, the fact that marijuana is used "for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician" cannot itself serve as a distinguishing factor. Id., at 1229. The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses.”

Congress is thus given the right to control all medical treatment through the commerce clause in contradiction to the 9^th and 10^th Amendments.

“Furthermore, the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544 (1979). Accordingly, the mere fact that marijuana—like virtually every other controlled substance regulated by the CSA—is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the CSA.”

The possibility of a right of the people to treat their illnesses as the see fit is not even contemplated in the face for governmental power.

“More fundamentally, if, as the principal dissent contends, the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is beyond the "`outer limits' of Congress' Commerce Clause authority," post, at 42 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.), it must also be true that such personal use of marijuana (or any other homegrown drug) for recreational purposes is also beyond those "`outer limits,'" whether or not a State elects to authorize or even regulate such use. JUSTICE THOMAS' separate dissent suffers from the same sweeping implications. That is, the dissenters' rationale logically extends to place any federal regulation (including quality, prescription, or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for any purpose beyond the "`outer limits'" of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.”

Again the plight of the Federal government not being able to effect an outcome it desires because it lacks the means is not a compelling argument for its possession of those means in the absence of Constitutional authority. It may wish to do many things but it must limit itself to only those things which it has been granted the authorization to do. This is much like any endeavor undertake by any party they may wish to have accomplish certain goals but their success depends on their resources and abilities.

“Second, limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation "in accordance with state law" cannot serve to place respondents' activities beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.”

“This Constitution, Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof” this clause only applies to laws that do not exceed the authority of the constitution. That there should be any question about the extent of that authority a stricter examination of justification for the law in question must be undertook if there is conflict with State law than if there is no such conflict.

“It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is "`superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,'" however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 196 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 426 (1925)). See also 392 U. S., at 195-196; Wickard, 317 U. S., at 124 ("`[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress'"). Just as state acquiescence to federal regulation cannot expand the bounds of the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., Morrison, 529 U. S., at 661-662 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (noting that 38 States requested federal intervention), so too state action cannot circumscribe Congress' plenary commerce power. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 114 (1941) ("That power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power") ”

Look how at how Federal rights are considered inviolate regardless of the circumstances or harm while Civil rights must at every turn yield to “reasonable” or “necessary” limitations. Here is were we see the gloss of compromise come out in the wash. In response to the Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States I would like to say that the Federal government may pass a law directing the flow or course of a river but that does not provide them with the means to control nature to the degree necessary to ensure that it complies with the law. Similarly it powers should not limit the powers of the States even when the exercise of those power might produces results contrary to the wishes of the Federal government. The Darby quote is interesting as that court decision cites Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v. ICR CO. where the law at question depends on State laws.

“Indeed, that the California exemptions will have a significant impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana is not just "plausible" as the principal dissent concedes, post, at 56 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.), it is readily apparent. The exemption for physicians provides them with an economic incentive to grant their patients permission to use the drug. In contrast to most prescriptions for legal drugs, which limit the dosage and duration of the usage, under California law the doctor's permission to recommend marijuana use is open-ended. The authority to grant permission whenever the doctor determines that a patient is afflicted with "any other illness for which marijuana provides relief," Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2005), is broad enough to allow even the most scrupulous doctor to conclude that some recreational uses would be therapeutic. ”

That doctors and patients should have medical discretion in their treatment of illnesses is presented here as a horror necessitate government regulation as are the basic forces of demand and the potential for some criminal activity. How any of these would be improved by legislation is not addressed nor can it be.

“The exemption for cultivation by patients and caregivers can only increase the supply of marijuana in the California market.^[41] The likelihood that all such production will promptly terminate when patients recover or will precisely match the patients' medical needs during their convalescence seems remote; whereas the danger that excesses will satisfy some of the admittedly enormous demand for recreational use seems obvious. ”

California is a State its internal market is its own concern. To claim criminal behavior in the absence of evidence is slanderous. Most people in this abide by laws that are injurious to them to state they would be unable to refrain from criminal actively because of the potential for gain shows a contempt for them and a misappraisal of reality.

“Moreover, that the national and international narcotics trade has thrived in the face of vigorous criminal enforcement efforts suggests that no small number of unscrupulous people will make use of the California exemptions to serve their commercial ends whenever it is feasible to do so.”

The criminal actions of others are not an acceptable basis for restricting the rights or freedoms of individuals.

“Taking into account the fact that California is only one of at least nine States to have authorized the medical use of marijuana, a fact JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent conveniently disregards in arguing that the demonstrated effect on commerce while admittedly "plausible" is ultimately "unsubstantiated," post, at 56, 55, Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggregate impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial.”

It is bizarre to talk of the effects on an illegal market as plausible concerns for Federal regulation. How can the government seek to enact prohibition and then act with the same justification as if it was trying to support the price of corn. Why should the price or other market features have any relevance to the governments “regulation” of a black market?

“So, from the "separate and distinct" class of activities identified by the Court of Appeals (and adopted by the dissenters), we are left with "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana." 352 F. 3d, at 1229. Thus the case for the exemption comes down to the claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically rather than sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation. Given the findings in the CSA and the undisputed magnitude of the commercial market for marijuana, our decisions in Wickard v. Filburn and the later cases endorsing its reasoning foreclose that claim.”

A wrong long standing becomes justice.

In closing let me address one point from Justice Scalia's concurance.

“It is misleading because, unlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, as this Court has acknowledged since at least United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72 (1838), Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id., at 78; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 301-302 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 119 (1942); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 342, 353 (1914); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 39-40 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).^[1]”

Necessary and Proper does not refer to those powers needed to achieve legitimate legislative goals but to those powers needed to enact legitimate pieces of legislation. Thus powers by which the government can directly assert control over interstate commerce are acceptable but those powers which assert indirect control over interstate commerce by controlling those factors which influence it are not. For example it could create an agency to collect taxes or conduct inspects as required by law for interstate goods. But excreting police power over the possession or use of goods by private citizens is not necessary and proper to the regulation on commerce among several states. Those things are not interstate commerce and thus stand outside the area of regulation granted to Congress that it should want to regulate them because direct enforcement or regulation might be hard or might fail to achieve its objective is not enough to make such powers necessary or proper. This is especially true when the objective such as in this case of preventing drug use is outside the scope of powers granted to Congress. Congress neither has a goal relating to commerce nor uses means relating to commerce thus it is absurd that such action be justified on that basis.

An NC Gun Blog: Look damn it, our company policy is NO GUNS. Wait, maybe we should re-evaluate that policy

An NC Gun Blog: Look damn it, our company policy is NO GUNS. Wait, maybe we should re-evaluate that policy

I think many who causally support gun control do so because they care about people and would like for no one to have a gun used against them rather than a particular conviction that the populous should be disarmed. When such people are faced with situation like this where an armed would be victim protects themselves and others from criminals that same compassion that lead them to support gun control will lead many to support the would be victim.

I think this is our biggest advantage and challenge. We have to reach out to people who may not know anything about guns and are likely justly afraid of being killed by criminals and persuade them that their desire for criminals not to have guns is unrealistic or requires the facilitation of the victimization of large numbers of vulnerable citizens and thus trying to enforce that desire through legislative means does more harm than good. We must put forth the less than ideal position that citizens should confront armed threats with an armed response.

Both gun rights supporters and gun control supporters don't want people to be killed with guns. Our opponents can stick to a idealized dream that they can not enact while disavowing the negative consequences of there proposals. We must support negative consequences of our position and accept the lesser of the evils that the criminal should hopefully be hurt or killed rather than would be victims.

I think most would agree that is a less evil but it is always easier to pretend that there is a perfect solution then to reconcile one's self to the imperfect.

Justifying Tyranny

There is opposition to the ownership and carrying of arms by 18-20 year olds. This opposition has decided to basis its argument on the contention that since people of that age group are less responsible that it is perfectly reasonable and acceptable to restrict their rights. If they could truly viewed gun ownership as a right rather than a danger they would see the horror that they are supporting in their logic.

Their logic is that rights and privileges of an individual may be restricted basis on the social groups that person belongs to and the ability of those groups to exercise the right in question comparatively responably.

The first injustice of argument is that assertion that people should be judged on the basis of the groups they belong to rather than their own actions or qualities. I think that all discrimination based on age is reprehensible but here it may allow the anti-gun crowd to argue for group restriction while maintaining that such restriction would be abhorrent if based on social class or ethnicity. I can only assume that they would find ethnic and class based restrictions abhorrent as I have never seen that asserted from their side and many of their advocated polices disenfranchise the poor and a disproportionate number persons belonging to minority ethnic groups.

The second injustice is that rights should be dependent on any comparative standard. That civil rights should be have to be earned, won, or justified by any standard is deplorable. But a comparative standard can be manipulated to achieve almost any result one desires. For example no social group will commit less crimes with guns than people in comas thus comparatively restrictions are justified on every other group. That one can lose one's rights through no misdeed or crime but the failure to manipulate the relative statistics is vile as is the abuse of statistics in this way.

It is hardly possible not to see the many abuses have resulted from justifying actions against a group on the basis of that group's inferiority. This rational has supported harassment, humiliation, oppression, slavery, exile, and genocide of countless people. It will never again be acceptable.

If the opponents of gun ownership wish to openly support all the applications of this principle as potential just (subject to a statistical prof of inferiority of the group) then they may use this logic without hypocrisy. Otherwise they endanger us all with their by foolishly trying to legitimize an exceedingly dangerous rational for very small gain.

Contracts and Freedom

I feel that the distinction I was making in Nebbia is to fine to me clear without some explanation. First I believe that taxes are a legitimate tool of the government and that the government may use them to address a wide verity of goals and ills. Second that direct government interference in contracts (or commercial actions) requires justification to a degree that taxes don't.

By limiting the freedom of contract the government is infringing on the rights of citizens it must then prove that by doing so it protects the rights of other citizens. I also think it must prove that their isn't a clearly less intrusive means to do so.

Limitations which allow substantial room for discretion are less intrusive than direct mandates. In fact mandates may rise to the point where it is questionable if contract is actually being freely entered into. That a contract be freely entered into is essential.

It is my contention that price setting prevents parties from freely entering into contract in a was lesser limitation do not. It is on this basis I think the court should have found the New York price controls unacceptable.

I think it would be good to have the regulation of monopolies and standard rates bases on statutory rights. Perhaps they could be worded something like this: "Items or Services offered for general sale shall not be altered in price based on the purchaser or any of the qualities of the purchaser." and "The citizens of the United States, any State, or any area within a State shall have the right and power through their respective governments to regulate the business of a monopoly or of any business functioning as a monopoly within their respective area."

Supreme Blunders

NEBBIA v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK

This is a case about a New York price fixing law for the milk products. This law was challenged on the basis of the 14^th Amendment which the court had previously held to protect freedom of contract. Also it should be noted that the making a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” is a power prohibited fo the States.

“The question for decision is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk. We first inquire as to the occasion for the legislation and its history. ”

Here we see a historical narrative an ploy that usually signals a departure for the law as written or for the establishment of some sort of exception. A good case is made for the importance of milk and the milk industry.

“Various remedies were suggested, amongst them united action by producers, the fixing of minimum prices for milk and cream by state authority, and the imposition of certain graded taxes on milk dealers proportioned so as to equalize the cost of milk and cream to all dealers and so remove the cause of price-cutting. ”

United Action fair response as it is a utilization of the right of producers act in their best interest and to associate as they choose. It should only be limited as far as it conflicts with the rights of the consumers to be free from commercial exploitation or the right of competitors to do business.

Price fixing can be legitimate if accomplished through the use Tax but is illegitimate if it merely mandates the price of commodities. Some price control measures may be legitimate if they protect against the exploitation of some group but they should be structured as a forfeiture tax apportioned to those exploited.

Taxes are in general within the powers justly held by the states to utilize as they will. Unless they are utilized in such as way as to deprive the people of their rights.

“We think the contention that the discrimination deprives the appellant of equal protection is not well founded. For aught that appears, the appellant purchased his supply of milk from a farmer as do distributors, or could have procured it from a farmer if he so desired. There is therefore no showing that the order placed him at a disadvantage, or in fact affected him adversely, and this alone is fatal to the claim of denial of equal protection.”

Here the court dismiss that two people must sell the same commodity for different prices as a violation of equal protection because they could by it for the same price from the same source.

“But if it were shown that the appellant is compelled to buy from a distributor, the difference in the retail price he is required to charge his customers, from that prescribed for sales by distributors is not on its face arbitrary or unreasonable, for there are obvious distinctions between the two sorts of merchants which may well justify a difference of treatment, if the Legislature possesses the power to control the prices to be charged for fluid milk. Compare American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 , 21 S.Ct. 43; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563 , 30 S.Ct. 578; State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 , 51 S.Ct. 540, 73 A. L.R. 1464 ”

American Sugar Refining Co. v Louisiana states “The act in question does undoubtedly discriminate in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimination, if founded upon a reasonable distinction in principle, is valid. Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes.”. This presents reasonableness as a valid infringement to the rights of people. If an action done to anyone group would be a violation if done to any other group is indeed a violation if done to the original group. Though in the case in question I think there would be an equal protection violation if the framers exempt from the tax sold their refined sugar or other wise acted as a refinery. Simply the act of refining sugar should not place one in the same class as those who sell it. But the court felt in this case that the historical preferences given to farmers justified unequal protection between sellers.

Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky here there is a clear business tax on a specific type of business (blending spirits) that applies to all who conduct it. The court rightly finds that this isn't a equal protection violation.

State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson is a tax on stores which increase per store with the number of stores owned. Think that the Tax could be an equal protection violation as constructed since the tax per store varies between owners but it is not clearly so since anyone owning the same number of stores would pay the same tax. I think the court decision to sustain the Tax is fair.

Each of these cases deals with Taxes not price fixing I would assert that a different set of standards should be in play. Though since they are currently dealing with the equal protection claim they are fair precedents.

“Second. The more serious question is whether, in the light of the conditions disclosed, the enforcement of section 312(e) denied the appellant the due process secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Here the court rightly recognizes that it is not equal protection but the potential violation of other rights that is really at question here. But with the negation of the “privileges and immunities” provision of the 14^th Amendment “due process” is the only mean by which that amendment grants protection.

“Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.”

This is a fair statement. Though detriment and harm must be treated very carefully so as not to grant the government control over every facet of both property use and contracts. Only when the rights of another are harmed should the government be able to act to safe guard those rights. For example the right of someone to engage in the selling of food may be limited by the rights of those he sells food to life and freedom from exploitation.

“Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.”

The rights of the people are and must be more fundamental than the powers of the government or the common interest.

“Thus has this court from the early days affirmed that the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in government. Touching the matters committed to it by the Constitution the United States possesses the power, as do the states in their sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the federal government, as shown by the quotations above given. These correlative rights, that of the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over property and freely to contract about his affairs, and that of the state to regulate the use of property and the conduct of business, are always in collision.”

This is true. But they federal government has placed itself as the guarantor of the rights of the people against the action of the States thus giving precedence to them.

“No exercise of the private right can be [291 U.S. 502, 525]   imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property. But subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the public need. ”

Here we see the inversion fundamental to the expansion of governmental power and intrusion into the freedoms of the people. Unless expressly granted the authority the government must yield to the rights of the people. That some infringement is inevitable is correct but that does not justify any infringement that could occur it only justifies that which is the minimum to needed to effect an expressed power of government or to protect the rights of the people (either other rights or other people).

“The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts.”

That the government may promote public welfare does not permit it to utilize any means it wishes. Again reasonableness is the cutting edge which expands the government's power and severs the rights of the people. The subjective nature of reasonableness is never addressed nor is the fact that once a rational is accepted as just in one circumstance it is accepted as such in others. It is even eventually defended as a long held power of the government even in those instances where it is unreasonable by even those who view it as such.

“The court has repeatedly sustained curtailment of enjoyment of private property, in the public interest. The owner's rights may be subordinated to the needs of other private owners whose pursuits are vital to the paramount interests of the community. The state may control the use of property in various ways; may prohibit advertising bill boards except of a prescribed size and location, or their use for certain kinds of advertising; may in certain circumstances authorize encroachments by party walls in cities; may fix the height of buildings, the character of materials, and methods of construction, the adjoining area which must be left open, and may exclude from residential sections offensive trades, industries and structures likely injuriously to affect the public health or safety; or may establish zones within which certain types of buildings or businesses are permitted and others excluded. And although the Fourteenth Amendment extends protection to aliens as well as citizens, a state may for adequate reasons of policy exclude aliens altogether from the use and occupancy of land.”

Of the examples listed only those limiting business injurious to public health and the requirements of certain materials and construction methods seem legitimate to me. The prohibition against certain kinds of advertising seems to me to be a clear violation of the rights of citizens. Other measures may or may not be acceptable depending on the circumstances.

“Laws passed for the suppression of immorality, in the interest of health, to secure fair trade practices, and to safeguard the interests of depositors in banks, have been found consistent with due process. 24 These measures not [291 U.S. 502, 527]   only affected the use of private property, but also interfered with the right of private contract. Other instances are numerous where valid regulation has restricted the right of contract, while less directly affecting property rights.”

Most of these measure are good with the exception of suppression of immorality which is subjective and tends to be used in an oppressive manner and protect no right of the people.

“The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases. Certain kinds of business may be prohibited; and the right to conduct a business, or to pursue a calling, may be conditioned. Regulation of a business to prevent waste of the state's resources may be justified. And statutes prescribing the terms upon which those conducting certain businesses may contract, or imposing terms if they do enter into agreements, are within the state's competency. Legislation concerning sales of goods, and incidentally affecting prices, has repeatedly been held valid.”

These are all good points and may be just areas for legislation. Though incidentally affecting prices is very different from fixing them.

“The public policy with respect to free competition has engendered state and federal statutes prohibiting monopolies, which have been upheld. On the other hand, where the policy of the state dictated that a monopoly should be granted, statutes having that effect have been held inoffensive to the constitutional guarantees. ”

I agree that it is just for the government to act against monopolies or to act to regulate them but I do not think it is just for the government to prohibit competition through the law.

“But we are told that because the law essays to control prices it denies due process. Notwithstanding the admitted power to correct existing economic ills by appropriate regulation of business, even though an indirect result may be a restriction of the freedom of contract or a modification of charges for services or the price of commodities, the appellant urges that direct fixation of prices is a type of regulation absolutely forbidden ”

This is I think where the appellant is correct that price fixing between two private parties intrudes to far into the rights of the people.

“The argument runs that the public control of rates or prices is per se unreasonable and unconstitutional, save as applied to businesses affected with a public interest; that a business so affected is one in which property is devoted to an enterprise of a sort which the public itself might appropriately undertake, or one whose owner relies on a public grant or franchise for the right to conduct the business, or in which he is bound to serve all who apply; in short, such as is commonly called a public utility; or a business in its nature a monopoly. The milk industry, it is said, possesses none of these characteristics, and, therefore, not being affected with a public interest, its charges may not be controlled by the state. Upon the soundness of this contention the appellant's case against the statute depends.”

Here we see case for the right of the people to be free from exploitation allowing the fixing of price in those instances where there is no less intrusive option. The assertion being that outside of those circumstance other means of preferable and required.

“The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or sells, and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 . ”

In Munn v Illinois the only objectionable thing in the law is the fix price. The requirement that a business adhere to common rate and that the business publish those rates seem does not prevent them for running their business freely or profitably. “We know that this is a power which may be abused; but that is no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.” The court in Munn reached far into British law to establish a justification for price fixing and then abdicated any responsibility for acting against the resulting abuses. Which I view as the courts responsibility as per the 1rst Anemdment's “petition the Government for a redress of grievances”

“The touchstone of public interest in any business, its practices and charges, clearly is not the enjoyment of any franchise from the state, Munn v. Illinois, supra. Nor is it the enjoyment of a monopoly; for in Brass v. [291 U.S. 502, 535]   North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 , 14 S.Ct. 857, a similar control of prices of grain elevators was upheld in spite of overwhelming and uncontradicted proof that about six hundred grain elevators existed along the line of the Great Northern Railroad, in North Dakota; that at the very station where the defendant's elevator was located two others operated; and that the business was keenly competitive throughout the state. ”

Brass v North Dakota is an escalation based on Munn even though the circumstances are quite different and the necessity and reasonableness is greatly reduced. Clearly showing the tendency for an grant of power to the government in one instance to be allowed in all.

“In German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 , 34 S.Ct. 612, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189, a statute fixing the amount of premiums for fire insurance was held not to deny due process. Though the business of the insurers depended on no franchise or grant from the state, and there was no threat of monopoly, two factors rendered the regulation reasonable. These were the almost universal need of insurance protection and the fact that while the insurers competed for the business, they all fixed their premiums for similar risks according to an agreed schedule of rates. The court was at pains to point out that it was impossible to lay down any sweeping and general classification of businesses as to which price-regulation could be adjudged arbitrary or the reverse.”

Insurance Companies function as a group monopoly and engage in business practices illegal in most other types of business. Also in the case mentioned there is no set price put forth in the law merely a prohibition on excessive rate and “special” that differ for those of similar circumstances. This is materially different that price fixing.

“Many other decisions show that the private character of a business does not necessarily remove it from the realm of regulation of charges or prices. The usury laws fix the price which may be exacted for the use of money, although no business more essentially private in character can be imagined than that of loaning one's personal funds. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 , 31 S.Ct. 132.”

The long standing relationship created by lending money increases the validity of state oversight and does the opportunity for abuse. Though mandating a fixed rate for all loans rather than a maximum rate would be unacceptable.

“Private contract carriers, who do not operate under a franchise, and have no monopoly of the carriage of goods or passengers, may, since they use the highways to compete with railroads, be compelled to charge rates not lower than those of public carriers for corresponding services, if the state, in pursuance of a public policy to protect the latter, so determines. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 274 , 53 S.Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721.”

In Stephenson v. Binford the price controls seem to be a clear overreach of government power and violation of equal protection. As it lets one type of business control another.

“It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory.”

“And it is equally clear that if the legislative policy be to curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal. The course of decision in this court exhibits a firm adherence to these principles. ”

These two stances negate one another if you claim you must judge each infringement on its own merits and also claim to have no base to make such judgments what you end up with is allowing any infringement. This is the same as saying that the State may enact what ever laws it wishes because it may be justified in enacting some of them.

“The Constitution does [291 U.S. 502, 539]   not secure to any one liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial group of the people. Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.”

Again it depends on the nature of that harm. If that harm is merely the lack of positive effect the government wishes to see that is not sufficient but if the harm is direct and real such as injury to another or their property then it is sufficient. Also the court has stated that by enacting legislation the Legislature has implied that anything it does is not arbitrary discriminatory or irrelevant and that the court has no basis to make judgments against the judgment of the legislature. This the courts last statement is without any real limitation.

Looking at the numbers

Sean D Sorrentino at NC Gun Blog has a good post looking at the FBI's crime statistics and Joan Peterson's difficulty interpreting them.

I decided to look at the number and Japetes' presentation of them starting with the number she presented in this comment.

Looking at the National Violent Death Reporting System (which seems to have data on 18 states) I wasn’t able to find 2000 number for location of death but I did find 2008 numbers. In 2008 72.96% of women were murdered in their “House, apartment, including driveway, porch, yard” vs 46.35 % of men. Interestingly both men and women have a lesser percentage of murders occurring in the home with firearms 42.74% and 70.35% and an increased percentage of non-firearm murders 55.71% and 76.78%. Not sure what any of that means but it is interesting. I did find 2000 data for WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports in 2000 there were 16,765 homicides and 10,801 firearm homicides so firearms where used in 64.4% homicides. I am not sure which Violence Policy Center number she used but the FBI number cover this issue.

As for her comment on FBI statistics 9,146 murders with firearms out of 13,636 total 2009 murders is 67.0723% not 71.8%. She needs 644.648 additional firearm murders within the 13,636 total or she needs to add 2,285.99 firearm murder to the total to get her numbers. Her percentage of firearm murder committed with handgun is correct. 

For murder by family members (141+ 609+ 131+ 116+ 247+ 201+ 94+ 35+ 281)/13636 I get 13.6% not 24.2% as does the FBI. For murder by person known to the victim (141+ 609+ 131+ 116+ 247+ 201+ 94+ 35+ 281+ 2941+ 404+ 138+ 472+ 132+ 12+ 20)/13636 I get 43.81% not 53.8% and by known persons other than family is (2941+ 404+ 138+ 472+ 132+ 12+ 20)/13636 = 30.20% the same as the FBI. She seems to be ignoring the murder where the murders relationship to the victim is not know while presenting those number as representative of all murders. Her next statistic 34.6% should be presented as percentage of all women murdered (not those where the offender is known) in 2009 know to have been killed by their husbands or boyfriends. Her murders related to argument statistic looks correct though including romantic triangles is odd to me without that (3334+203)/(13636-4832) = 40.17492%. Murders related to other Felonies 2020/13636 = 14.81% of total murders but 22.9% of murders with known circumstances. She is correct about the percentage of murders reported with unknown circumstances

It is interesting that there is Circumstance data for murders of unknown relationship to the victim. The rate for people murdered by people they know excluding Acquaintances related to other felonies is (2020-503-489-804)/3033 = 7.39% for Acquaintances it is 503/2941 = 17.10% and Strangers 489/1676 = 29.18%. For murders of unknown relationship but known circumstances 804/(5986-3488) = 32.19% were related to another felony. This leads me the think (but does not prove) that many of the murders with unknown relationships to their victim are likely to be strangers. This is consistent logic that it is harder to identify murder who lack a relationship with their victims.

It is also clear from the data that there is a large problem with Black males committing murder and being murdered. WISQARS places the 2000-2007 puts the murder rate at 38.86 per 100000 for black males vs 9.86 for all males, 5.61 for white males, 3.81 for all whites, 2.68 for white females, 6.69 for black females, and 6.21 for the whole population. If you exclude black males that rate for the whole population drops to ((72248+ 1877+ 3255+ 5132+ 10725)/(1895436257+ 25347849+ 106480875+ 131828724+ 160307042))x 10000 = 4.02. The FBI statistics have 5890/(5890+ 5286+ 245) = 51.57% for homicides where the offender’s race is known were committed by black offenders and 6556/(6568+ 6556+ 360) = 48.62% of murder victims where the victims race was know were black. US Census Bureau puts the 2009 population at 307,006,556 and the total black alone or in combination is 40,903,772 and so comprise 13.32% (12.41% if you count only single race respondents) of thew population. For such a relatively small fraction of the population to account for close to half of those who murder and those who are murdered is very serious problem.

I think that the solution to that problem isn't arms control. There are many places in the world such as Nigeria where the lack of firearms has not provided safety for the people. I think that we need to change our laws and society so criminal isn't the highest paying job in poor communities in this country.